Abstract
Introduction
Do you remember how Customer Relationship Management (CRM) was going to change the fundamental rules of marketing within the firm (Sheth and Sisodia, 1999) . Pine et al (1995) argued that customers would relish ever more personalised service and would co-develop solutions with supply networks (Hagel and Singer Marc, 2000) to unleash greater value-in-use for their purchases (Vargo and Lusch, 2004) . Companies would also benefit from this fundamental shift since most customers inherently value relationships (Sheth and Parvatiyar, 1995) and small increases in customer retention would deliver significant increases in profitability over the lifetime of these relationships (Reichheld, 1996) .
In reality, events have turned out very differently. Between 2000 and 2005, firms invested $220 billion in CRM solutions (Payne, 2006 ) and yet the majority of firms fail to deliver targeted ROI on their investments (Roberts, Liu and Hazard, 2005; Rigby, Reichheld and Schefter, 2002; PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2002) . Customer satisfaction levels have not improved during this time either; the US customer satisfaction index has barely changed over the past decade 1 . In fact, we would argue that it is one of the great paradoxes of these unprecedented levels of marketing investment in CRM that has left customers ever more cynical and disloyal. However, we believe that CRM can be severely compromised even before the implementation process begins and the above factors impact the outcomes. This is because the discounted cash flow (DCF) analysis that dominates business case thinking often locks marketers into CRM strategies before they have learnt how customers wish to engage with the firm (Maklan, Knox and Ryals, 2005) . The traditional business case assumes that, as a result of CRM investment, consumer behaviour will change by a pre determined amount in order to justify the incremental revenue identified in the business case. Thus, the CRM sequence is regarded as linear: analysis-business case-investmentto acquire resources-implement CRM-change consumer behaviour-profit.
We do not regard such a linear approach is appropriate for CRM investment decision making and adopt a Dynamic Capabilities perspective (Teece, Pisano and Shuen, 1997) which suggests that CRM investment must account for the heterogeneity of individual firms' CRM resources and capabilities. Not all firms can successfully implement the CRM strategy and processes offered by CRM software vendors, particularly when their dynamic CRM capabilities are lacking.
In this paper, we argue that companies have invested heavily in CRM resources (databases, web sites, analytical tools, call centres) but insufficiently in the Dynamic Capabilities required to select, develop and deploy these CRM resources effectively (Teece, Pisano et al, 1997) . We further argue that this arises because Dynamic Capabilities are grounded in managers' tacit knowledge of the business and are therefore notoriously difficult to identify, let alone manage. We explore how such Dynamic Capabilities can be surfaced using Action Research amongst the management of two organisations facing major CRM investment decisions:
decisions that would have profound implications for marketing strategy. In both instances, an emergent approach to building the firm's CRM investment strategy led to a much greater awareness of the Dynamic Capabilities needed to support CRM and to changes in how customer relationship investment was managed. First, we provide the context for our research, that is, the companies involved and the marketing/customer relationship problems faced by each. Then we describe our research method and process, and the results which led to the surfacing of tacit knowledge about the Dynamic Capabilities in each firm and how investment in marketing resources was subsequently developed as a result. We close the paper with a section on the limitations of our research and offer directions for further research.
In the next section, we briefly explore the literature on Dynamic Capabilities; how it has evolved from the Resource Based View, its definition and why the nature of Dynamic Capabilities has blurred both the development of theory and practice in this area.
What are Dynamic Capabilities and why have they been overlooked?
The Resource Based View (RBV) is the dominant theory in Strategy literature (Newbert, 2007) ; it explains sustained, superior performance as a function of the heterogeneity of firm-specific resources such as brands, customer relationships and distribution partnerships (Barney, 1991 (Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000:1107) .
This definition implies that the firm is better able than its competitors at learning from customers (Vargo and Lusch, 2004) , more adept at changing core business processes and routines (Winter, 2003; Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000) and continually reconfigures, enhances and deploys (Rindova and Kotha, 2001 ; Teece, Pisano and Shuen, 1997) resources in a manner that creates superior customer value and hence superior performance in the marketplace.
However, the vary nature of these Dynamic Capabilities means that they are very difficult to manage and develop. Scholars liken the challenge of identifying and managing them to "observing the unobservable" (Rouse and Daellenbach, 1999; Godfrey and Hill, 1995) . Dynamic Capabilities arise from the everyday tasks of the firm's employees (Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000) and are often the unquestioned "how we do things around here" activities that permit some firms to distinguish themselves, for example, by providing better customer service than their competitors. They are grounded in tacit knowledge (Polanyi, 1976) which ensures that they are not easily documented, transferred internally between business units and, more importantly, cannot readily be imitated by competitors. Dynamic Capabilities exist in complex bundles with other capabilities and resources (Black and Boal, 1994) . It is therefore difficult for managers to identify, let alone assess the impact of any one Dynamic Capability on market performance. In certain circumstances, Dynamic Capabilities can be linked to competitive advantage and ultimately to superior profitability but, because of the inherent difficulties of managing and measuring these internal drivers, casual ambiguity rather 
Presenting a framework for surfacing and developing

Dynamic Capabilities
Marketing managers lack a pragmatic framework to first identifying and then developing the Dynamic Capabilities needed to invest in CRM successfully (Maklan, 2004) . The authors develop such a framework for consumer markets (Figure 1 ) from the extant work of both Webster (1992) 
Using this Framework
The Action Research Method
As Dynamic Capabilities are highly context specific and grounded in tacit knowledge, identifying and understanding them requires enquiry from within the firm (Susman and Evered, 1978; Rouse and Daellenbach, 1999) . To enable such internal deliberations, we adopted an Action Research approach (Reason and Torbert, 2001 ) with the managers responsible for developing CRM in the two focal firms reported here.
Action Research is a form of participatory enquiry. In this instance, the managers responsible for the successful development of CRM engage in cycles of reflection and action over a period of time using our framework ( Figure 1 ) to generate the knowledge that they require to improve their day-to-day performance. These cycles of reflection and action raise managers' tacit understanding of their CRM-related routines and surface Dynamic Capabilities to the extent that they can ultimately be identified and managed. Action
Research develops effective learning systems in companies (Argyris and Schön, 1978) , inspires commitment to change (Clark, 1972 ) and can transform CRM practices (Heron and Reason, 1999) . Such enquiries are led by the managers and conducted in their interests. Eden and Huxham (1996) propose certain criteria for ensuring Action Research is rigorous and contributes to scholarship. In order to contribute to scholarship, the research must have implications beyond the immediate decisions to be taken by managers in the two cases presented: in this instance, the emerging theory of Dynamic Capabilities which we contribute to developing in the context of marketing. The rigour of the research, its recoverability (Checkland and Holwell, 1998) and ability to be assessed, arises from the method and orderliness concerning the processes of collecting and reflecting upon the data generated from the two companies reported.
Action Research Practices
The companies formed cross-functional enquiry teams to assess their CRM strategies. The team leaders chaired initial meetings that established the principles of the research; that is, the authors and team members were equal co-researchers engaging in cycles of reflection and action in order to improve managers' practice as well as to create more generalised learning. The teams agreed to a series of workshops in which participating managers prepared formal presentations based upon workshop tools developed by the authors (Appendix 2). This preparation, combined with group discussions and agreement, promoted the cycles of learning and generated the core set of data and artefacts for analysis. The workshop tools were continually modified by the teams consistent with the democratic nature of Action Research.
Each workshop was recorded by the authors to enable preparation for future workshops, briefings and discussion. These tapes were listened to shortly after each session alongside a review of all the material generated. We At the end of the research process, the authors met with team members individually and, using a semi structured questionnaire, probed to ensure that the process was democratic, the team's conclusions were accepted by the individual as valid and that the individuals were committed to the outcomes and actions agreed. Commitment to action agreed through valid information is a key test of Action Research's validity (Argyris, 1973; Clark, 1972) . In total, the authors analysed over 60 hours of recorded contact time and several hundred pages of artefacts. Figure 2 describes the process by which the two management teams used our Dynamic Capabilities framework. The framework allows each team to develop firm-specific management tools which they then use in a series of workshops over two to three months to develop a shared understanding of their current and future marketing Dynamic Capabilities in order to implement their customer strategies more effectively. A fuller explanation of these tools and how they were used is provided in Appendix 2.
The Action Research Process
To reduce complexity and circumvent the non-linear nature of this type of research, each study is presented to the reader in short format using the following logic flow: Both companies faced market-place challenges which suggested they needed either to invest more or invest differently in CRM. In both cases, the marketing managers responsible decided first to evaluate and shape these investment decisions themselves. By agreeing to engage with us in Action Research designed to introduce a greater visibility of their respective Dynamic Capabilities supporting CRM, they are acknowledging the need to evaluate both together. In particular, both teams were looking to make explicit their assumptions about the inter-relationship between their CRM resources and related Dynamic Capabilities in order to develop marketing practices which optimised their firm's overall CRM investments.
Bet-Co
Bet-Co was a pioneer in offering a web-based means for consumers to negotiate bets directly with other consumers. The founders expected that the social interaction it offered would create a unique community locking in consumers and their online betting friends exclusively to the Bet-Co site. The service was launched in the UK using traditional mass marketing strategies and attracted the largest number of online betters. Simultaneously, a rival entered the market with a betting exchange that aggregated and resolved bets anonymously, thus avoiding the time and complexity of having to parcel large bets for individual takers. The exchange appealed to the serious better and by the end of the launch year, the rival had 50% of the market versus BetCo's 4%. In response, Bet-Co relaunched its service as a betting exchange.
The marketing managers felt that they needed to offer some relationshipbased advantages to its larger competitor in order to convince large betters to use its site which was far less liquid due to the lower level of aggregate betting.
At the start of the Action Research enquiry, Bet-Co managers considered that they were retreating from relationship marketing into transactional marketing.
However, through the enquiry process, they discovered that they had been effectively compensating for Bet-Co's lack of liquidity (versus its larger rival), increasing betting activity on its site whilst maintaining the necessary balance of backers and layers, winners and losers across a variety of betting interests.
If, for example, a major backer of greyhounds was active, managers knew that the site would need to compensate with the activity of 20 layers because of the relative propensities for backing and laying amongst its greyhound betters. They had also developed a profound insight into their supply chain, knowing which of their partner web sites refer a lot of greyhound layers.
Managers would increase incentives to those sites rich in greyhound-layer referrals to maintain the balance of backing and laying on the site and thus allow bets to clear. Underpinning this impressive network marketing was a profound insight into the betting preferences and behaviours of its largest betters and those betters whose standing in the community made them market-makers: people with a following who could build a market for Bet-Co quickly. Instead of Bet-Co retreating to transactional marketing, the enquiry team understood that it had moved from relationship to network marketing.
Tasks undertaken as part of the enquiry confirmed that its network marketing capabilities were more advanced than its larger competitor as was its customer insight resource. It was decided that this combination of resource A previously discontinued customer bulletin board was reinstated. Special programmes were devised for bookmakers.
In the year that Bet-Co changed its business model from peer-to-peer betting to an exchange, and engaged in the Action Research process, its market share rose to 30%.
Car-Co
Car-Co is the exclusive UK importer and distributor of Car-Co cars and is fully-owned by its worldwide holding company. Hence managers were concerned that if the distribution environment and consumer behaviour changed radically, Car-Co could be left with a high cost dealer network and little ability to influence consumer experience and behaviour through the emerging new channels.
During the enquiry, managers used the capability framework in a scenario planning 5 context to build capabilities models and marketing approaches for varying degrees of change. Under a scenario of radical change, managers built a competency model characteristic of networked consumer relationships.
They concluded that the changes in its marketing Dynamic Capabilities required to implement network marketing were contingent upon creating marketing knowledge consistent with a one-to-one consumer relationship.
Without more individualised consumer understanding, it was not possible to change the remaining three Dynamic Capabilities. The firm's commitment to make these changes was not judged to be a realistic proposition without an immediate and serious threat to its business; there was too much uncertainty about any future distribution scenario to mobilise the organisation.
The managerial insights prompted a more considered approach to CRM investment. Car-Co (UK) concluded it would not be an early adaptor of the proposed corporate CRM system. Rather, it would focus its resources on finishing and leveraging its existing CRM programme and creating an owners' web site. Managers also decided to quicken the pace at which it could build consumer insight by taking the management of online consumer communication in-house and its associated analytic functions, reversing a previous decision to use third parties. In essence, Car-Co was making a "real 
Dynamic Capabilities develop incrementally along a continuum defined by transactional, one-to-one and network marketing relationships.
In both cases, managers moved incrementally along this marketing capabilities continuum. Bet-Co launched by recruiting many betters to a transactional relationship. Over time, it developed better insight and services for its key betters (one-to-one / relationship marketing) and based on this insight, the company was able to compensate across the site for the behaviour of key betters and leverage its market-making betters for growth (network marketing). Car-Co managers, on the other hand, experimented with network marketing in workshops but could not imagine how it would be profitable because they lacked the relationship marketing capabilities to understand fully how they would develop and profit from it. Instead, Car-Co managers plan to build consumer insight and use that as the foundation of any future relationship marketing investment. This finding suggests that investment plans based upon companies' ability to "leap-frog" from a very transactional approach to "best practice" relationship marketing (or even network marketing) is likely to fail. A company's current marketing Dynamic
Capabilities limit its customer strategy options.
The Dynamic Capabilities of marketing are interdependent.
A firm cannot hope to generate demand associated with relationship marketing without having the necessary consumer insight, brand building and relationship management capabilities. Capability changes are multifaceted and do not usually occur simultaneously in a big-bang fashion. Both the firms we report on here found that their current capabilities reflect a mix of transaction, relationship and network marketing, although one particular kind of marketing capability was usually dominant. This finding has a direct parallel with Coviello et al (2002) who found that firms have a mixture of marketing practices across similarly defined forms of marketing.
The rate of capability change seems to depend on the industry context.
Car-Co will develop its relationship marketing capabilities carefully over time;
however, the consumer purchase cycle in that industry is approximately three years. Bet-Co evolved from transaction to relationship to network marketing in approximately one year. Its best customers used its site several times a day.
This frequent contact allowed Bet-Co managers to experiment continually with different customer treatment strategies and therefore learn more quickly about its customers than Car-Co could. It is unlikely therefore that a one-size-fits-all approach to implementing CRM will prove successful; the market context creates boundary conditions for the speed of implementation. Moreover, we maintain that it would be unwise to accelerate rapidly the implementation of CRM, because capability development speed is, in part, limited by the market context.
Managerial Implications
At the beginning of this paper, the authors suggest that the level of CRM investment failure is unacceptably high and this is usually because firms invest in marketing resources without paying sufficient attention to developing the Dynamic Capabilities that are needed to make these investments successful. Our findings offer both hope and challenge to managers.
Dynamic Capabilities theory reassures marketing management that they can improve their CRM investments, provided they ensure that managerial practices and organisational routines evolve to support their core marketing resources. In addition, any investment in developing Dynamic Capabilities should coincide with, or even precede, investment in CRM resources.
Capabilities require the active participation of managers in their development and will not develop automatically from resource investment. Makadok (2001) identifies a split amongst RBV scholars between resource pickers and resource builders; our research suggests managers must do both to be successful in CRM.
Managers directly concerned with customer management must lead the process of building Dynamic Capabilities needed to support CRM investment.
The use of third parties, particularly when they wish merely to modify standardised, replicable CRM programmes, should be approached with extreme caution. The process of identifying and then developing Dynamic
Capabilities requires the surfacing of tacit knowledge; by definition this is highly contextual and defies rote adoption of universal "best practice" CRM.
Action Research is a legitimate means of achieving this managerial goal.
Finally, the investment case for CRM, its targets and its subsequent implementation policies, must acknowledge certain limitations upon the ability of managers to select any customer strategy that they chose (Mintzberg, Ahlstrand, and Lampel, 1998) and the timing of the business benefits.
Dynamic Capabilities represent a boundary condition; a company is limited by its current capabilities and the rate at which those capabilities develop is, in part, determined by the market in which the firm operates.
Limitations and Further Research
The findings of this paper are based on only two qualitative studies and are not generalisable in the same way that a positivist approach using a representative sample of companies would be. As mentioned earlier, in order 
